Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1950

Joseph Judkins, Dan J. Miller, Frank Oborn and
Adrian De Bloois v. Boyd N. Fronk : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Samuel C. Powell; Derrah B. Van Dyke; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Judkins v. Fronk, No. 7600 (Utah Supreme Court, 1950).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1363

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

E. [)

CASE NO. 7600

F 1 L1 0 \950
~Q\J

........_.....

--------~--~~~~~ Ot

In the Supreme

COUrt ·

of the State of Utah
JOSEPH JUDKINS, DAN J. MILLER,
FRANK OBORN, and ADRIAN DE BLOOIS,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
BOYD N. FRONK,

Defendant and Appellant

Appellant's Brief
SAMUEL C. POWELL,
DERRAH B. VAN DYKE,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
J.O.WOODT PAI.TIM'i CO.,OGIHN, UTAH

TABLE OF tiONTENTS
Page

STATEl\IENT 0 F F .A. CTS________________________________________________ 1
STATEniENT OF POINTS·------------------------~·----4, 9, 12, 16
ARG lT~fENT -------------------------------- ___ .______ ----------.-----------...... __ 4

1. APPELLANT'S POINT I:
By receiving a valid building permit from
Ogden City, performing work thereunder,
and expending funds in reliance thereon,
appellant acquired a vested right to construct a service station, and could not he·
affected by a subsequent zoning ordinance
enacted by Ogden CitY------------------------------------------------ 4

2. APPLEEANT 'S POINT II:
Appellant did not lose his vested right to
construct a service station when national
war emergeney legislation prevented him
from obtaining priorities for building ma-·
te rials ___________________________________ .______ ... ___ --------. __ ........ _........ __ 9

3. APPELLANT'S POINT III:
Board of City Commissioners of Ogde·n
City had power to renew appellant's building permit __________________ --- ___ ------- _---------.----------------............12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
4. APPELLANT'S POINT IV:
Appellant did not abandon the intended
construction of the service station............................16
5. APPELLANT'S P·OINT V:
The Dis,trict Court erred in granting an
. .
t"lOU Ill
. th"IS case ............ ---------··· ........................ 16
InJUllC
CON CL U SI 0 N ------------------.... -----.----------------------------... ___ ........ 16
AUTHORITIES CIT_E(I):
42 American Jurisprudence, Paragraph 209,
Pages 610 et seq ----------------------------------------------------------------14
43 American Jurisprudence, Paragraph 255,
- p·age~s~ 7 2, ·73 _. ______ ........ _____ .____ .. ____ ........ _____ ... ____ ....................14
40 ALR 928 ---------------------------------------------------------------·-······· 5
138 ALR 500, particularly pages 505, et seq ................ 5
Atla.s v. Dick, 81 NYS 2d 126 ( 1948) -------------------········· 9
Henry Bennett et al v. State Corporation
Commission (I{ansas) 142 Pac. 2d 810, 150
ALR 1140· .. _.. ___ ................ ------...... -----.-----... --........ --------........14
City of Lee Falls v. Fisk (1941) 24 NYS 2d
460, HN 12 ------~-----··--···-··-···-----------------------------------------------· 8
Dobbins v. Los Angeles 195 US 223, 49 L ed
169; 25 S Ct. 18.... ---------------------------------------------------············· 7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~ ~

Page
London

Y.

Robinson et al (Cal.) 271 Pac. 921 ............ 8

:JieQuillin on l\lunicipal Corporations Vol. 1,
Second Edition, Parag·ra.ph 390, Page 1068.............. 14
Nationa.l Grain Yeast Corp. v. City of Crystal
Lake 14 7 F 2d 711 ( CCA 7th 1945) -----------------·········--·---11
New York Life Insurance Company v. Durham 166 F 2d 87 4 ( CCA) -------------------·-·····------------------···~12
New York State Investing Co. v. Brady, 214
App. Div. 592, 212 NYS 605·-------------------------·················· 5
Pelham View Apartments v. Switzer, 130
Misc. 545, 224 NYS 56 ...... ---------------------------------··-··--········ 6
Sandenburgh v. ~lichigamme Oil Co. 249
Mich. 372, 228 NW 707 ------------------------··--····-----·-····---------·· 6
Trans-oceanic Oil Corporation vs. City of
Santa Barbara (Cal. 1948) 194 Pac. 2d 148................ 8
Walton v. Tracy Loan and Trust Company,
97 Utah 249, 92 Pac. 2d 724...............................

r ••••••••••••

16

Wikstrom v. City of Laramie, et al (Wyoming) 262 P ac. 22 ................. -------.......................... __ ...... .... 8

STATUTES AND ORDINANCE;S CITED:
Building Code of Ogden CitY-----------------------------·---------·--15

.

Section 15-8-95 U. C. A. 1943 __________ --------------------------------15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JOSEPH JUDKINS, DAN J. MILLEiR,
FRANK OBORN, and ADRIAN DE BLOOIS,
Plaintiffs a;n,d Resp,ondents,
vs.

BOYD N. FRONK,
Defendant and App-ellant

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant on June 6th and 7th, 1945, contracted to
purchase real property on the Northeast eorner of 20th
Street and Harrison Boulevard in Ogden, Utah, {Tr.
28, 30, 90) for the purpose of erecting a gasoline service
station thereon, (Tr. 30) subsequently receiving deed
therefor and quieting title to ,a portion thereof. (Tr. 90)
On June 7, 1945, he paid the fee and obtained from
Ogden City a building permit to construct such se·rvice
station. (Tr. 3, 31) At the time of issuance of such
permit, the zoning ordinances of Ogden City in force
and effect allowed use of real prope·rty in that area of
which this property is a part, for sueh service station
and store purposes. (Tr. 3, 4) The Building Code of
Ogden City, in effect at the time of issuance of the
pe·rmit to appellant, contained a provision that ''Every
permit issued by the Building Official under the provisions of this Code shall expire by limitation 8Jld become null and void, if the building or work authorized
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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by such permit is not commenced within 60 days from
the date of such permit, or if the building or work
authorized by such permit is suspended or abandoned
at any time after the work is commeneed for sixty days.''
CTr. 27) The building permit issued to appellant, had
a provision, written on the face thereof, that "This permit is void if work is not commenced within sixty days,
or if work is suspended for sixty days." (Tr. 3, 31)
The building Code also provides for a Board of Examiners and Appeals with power to interpret its provisions,
with specific power to interpret it in cases where a
"manifest injustice might be done". (Tr. 3) However,
Ogden City has never appointed such a Board of_ Examiners and Appeals as so provided for in the Building
Code~

In reliance upon his building permit, the appellant
immediately commenced work and expended money toward the erection of the service station. (Tr. 28) In
August, 1945, he mortgaged his home for $1,400.00 for
funds for the station. (Tr. 42, 49, 67) Each month from
and including June, 1945, to and including March, 1946,
he performed work on the premises toward building the
station. ( Tr. 27 to 31, 39 to 68) Then, in the early months
of 1946, he called on various lumber and supply houses
for mate-rials and was informed that he .must have a
Government priority number. (Tr. 51) He immediately
made ~application for priorities to the Civilian Production Administration, both at its Ogden and Salt Lake
City offices, which application was denied. (Tr. 52)
On August 12th, 1946, Ogden City passed an ordinance amending its zoning ordinances to make use of
real property in the area m which appellant's said
2
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premises 'Yere located for a store or service sta.tion, a
non-conforming- use. (Tr. 3) This ordinance was not
retroacti Ye. ( Tr. 3, 4)
On July 25, 1947, the controls over building materials were terminated by the executive order of the President of the United States, (Tr. 67, 68) but shortage of
such ·materials and great difficulty in obtaining· them
continued until to or after October, 1948. ( Tr. 31 to 38
inc., 68 to 76). On October 13, 1948, a.pp.ellant, believing
that now he cot~ld get materials, applied to the Board
of City Commissioners of Ogden City for a renewal of
his building permit of June 7, 1945, ( Tr. 6, 7, 56, 57}
and after hearing had during which he expl,ained his
difficulties regarding building materials to the Board
of City Commissioners, (Tr. 66) this Board on October
26, 1948, granted his application and renewed said building permit. (Tr. 7, 8, 56, 57) On November 23, -1948,
respondents protested to the Board of City Commissioners and hearing on their protest was continued to
November 30, 1948, (Tr. 7, 8) when respondents and
their counsel were present and appellant and his counsel
were present, and after such hearing the City Commission refused to rescind its action in renewing app.ellant's
original building permt. (Tr. 7, 8)
That up to October 13, 1948, the appellant had
expended on the land in question in relation to work in
connection with construction of the station, an amount
in excess of $1,200.00, and since the 26th of October,
1948, the date of renewal of his permit, he caused further
sums to he expended in exces.s of $900.00. (Tr. 59)
3
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R,espondents brought this action seeking an injunction against appellant to res,train him from constructing
the station and from _a judgment in their favor, appellant
appeals.
The trial of this ease was had by the District Court
on the 25th day of November, 19~9, but the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law were not entered therein
until the 23rd day of September, 1950.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
BY RE1CEIVING A VALID BUILDING PERMIT
FROM OGDEN CIT'Y, PERFORMING WORK
THEREUNDER, AND EXPENDING FUNDS IN RELIANCE THEREON, APPELLANT ACQUIRED A
VESTED RIGHT TO CONSTRUCT A SERVICE
STATION, AND COULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY
A SUBSEQUENT' ZONING ORDINANCE ENACTED
BY OGDEN CITY.
There is no dispute of the fact that the appellant
was issued a building permit on June 7, 1945, for the
purpose of constructing a service station upon his land,
and the findings of the Court so hold. It is not disputed
that at the time of issuance, of the appellant's pe·rmit,
it was lawful under the Zoning Ordinances of Ogden
City to erect a service station in the area in which
appell~ant 's land is situated. In reliance upon this peTmit.,
appellant performed a great deal of work and expended
large sums of money prior to the time, in August, 1946,
when Ogden City amended its Zoning Ordin~ance to prohibit such use in this area, the amended Ordinance not
being retroactive.
4
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It is the over\Yhelming weight of authority in the
United StatPs that one \Yho thus receives a valid building permit, performs \\·ork and expends money in reliance thereon, acquires a Yested right to complete the
construction. The right is unaffected by subsequent
amendments of Zoning Ordinances. 40 ALR at page
928 states the rule as follows :
•'By the weight of authority a municipal
building· permit or license may not arbitrarily
be revoked, particularly where, on the faith of
it, the 0\\1Jler has incurred material expense."
There many cases are annotated which follow the· weight
of authority.
·
In an annotation commencing at page 500 and particularly at page 505 et. seq. of 138 ALR cases are
cited and discussed, which hold that one who has obtained a building permit or license and has proceeded
to act under it, has thereby acquired a vested right
which is protected against disturbance hy a subsequen~t
amendment of the Zoning Ordinance. Among the cases
cited in this annotation at page 506, is New York State
Investing Co. v. Brady, 214 App. Div. 592, 212 NYS
605, where it was held by the New York Court that an
amendment of the building zone resolution prohibiting
the erection of a gasoline filing· station in a certain
location did not cut off the right of the owner or lessee
of such premises to proceed under a permit for the
construction of such a station where the permit was
obtained and work had been commenced thereunder and
a large amount of money expended in connection therewith prior to the adoption of the amendment.
5
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Also, in the ease of Sande11burgh v. Michigamme Oil
Co. 249 Mich;._ 372, 228 NW 707 it was held that after
property in a business zone had been purchased for the
purpose of constructing a gasoline filling station thereon
'
a. building permit obtained, and substantial work performed thereunder, the city was precluded from revoking the pe-rmit and later amending the zoning ordinance with reference solely to this property and was
precluded from giving such amendment retroactive effect.
In aiLother Ne'v York case set out in this annotation,
Pelham View Apartments, v. Switzer, 130 Mis_c. 545,. 224
NYS 56, it was held that one who had secured a building
permit for an apartment house upon a site where apartment houses were allowed by the zoning orcdinance
then in effeet, and in reliance upon such permit, purchased the lot, employed an architect, had the property
surveyed, ·and exca va.ted the- cellar, could not be deprived. of the vested. right thus- acquired by a subsequent
revocation- of the· permit pursuant to an amendment of
the zoning o-rdinance. The Court said :
' 'Where~ a. permit to build. a building has been
acted upon, and wherH the owner has, as in this
instance,. proceeded to incur obligations and in
good faith to r>roceed to erect the building, such
rfghts are then vested property rights, protected
by the Federal and State Constitutions . . .
Wbile it is unfortunate that the erection of this
apartment house . may be distasteful to. pe_ople
living in the neighborhood,. and while perhaps
it is unf_ortunate tha.t their property should. be
thus affected, yet the protection of such rights
must be legally done, and the public officials
6
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representing the people cannot leg:ally be permitted to· change the zoning· law, and cancel a
permit preYiousl~? issued under the original zoning· act, 'vhere an innocent purchaser of real
estate has in g·ood faith acted upon such official
action of the city, and has thereby acquired vested
rights under his permit. This case must he distinguished from the many· other c-ases where
permits w·ere not obtained in good faith, but
merely in anticipation of an· amendment to the
zoning la,Y. The facts in the present case indicate entire good faith upon the parf of the purchaser, as is evidenc_ed by the large sums of
money that were paid by him on the strength. of
the presumed legality of his original permit. It
would be·· nothing short of confiscation, and a
complete disregard of constitutional rights, if a
munic~pality could revoke a building pe-rmit issued under the conditions as presented in this
case.,.,
Likewise in another case cited in the· annotation,
a California case which: went to- the S-upreme Co11rt. of
the United States, Dobbins v. Los- Ange-les,, 195 US 223,
49 L ed 169·, 25 S Ct. 18, where an a.mendme,nt. of a.
municipal ordinance prohibiting- the erection or maintenance of gas works. except within certain prescribed
limits which excluded property previously included
therein, after it had been purchased for the purpos.e of
erecting- gas works thereon and after s:uch erection had
been commenced under a permit from the Board of Fire
Commissioners., was held to be an arbitrary interfe-rence
with property rights prote.cte_d by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution and not justified as an exercise of the police power.
7
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In the case of Wikstrom v. City of Laramie, et al
(Wyoming) 262 Pac. 22, it is .stated:
"It may, however, not he out of place in
passing, to state that, as a general rule, where a
City Council, or the proper city officer, in absence
of fr aud grants a permit for the construction of
a building, and the party acting in the fai,th thereof commences the erection of a building, he· acquires something more than a mere license, something in the nature of a vested right, and the
permit cannot then be revoked by the City.''
1

In the case of London vs. Robinson et al (Cal.) 271
Pac. 921, it was held that
a zoning ordinance enacted by a muncipality applied only from the date on which it took effect.
In City of Lee Falls v. Fisk, 24 NYS 2d 460 (1941)
HN 12, a prospective purchaser of real estate disclosed
to City officials that he intended to purchase realty and
erect a gas station thereon. He was informed there
was no ordinanee preventing the erection of such station.
Thereafter he purchased the realty, receiving a mortgage loan to finance the erection of the station, en.tered into a lease, notified tenants in houses located on
the realty to move therefrom and made an agreement
with a, wrecking company to raze· the houses. The
Court held that the purchaser of the realty acquired
vested rights of which he was not divested by action of
the common council of the city in thereafter enacting a
zoning ordianee which would prevent the erection of
such a station on the realty in question.
In the ease of Trans-oceanic Oil Corporation vs.
City of Santa Barbara (Cal. 1948) 194 Pac. 2d 148, it
8
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was held that a. holder of a building permit, who actually
commenc.es \vork upon a building· and incurs liabilities
for work and material, acquires a ''vested property
right" \Yhich he is entitled to have protected against
arbitrary revocation of permit, and also holds that
"There a permit has been regularly issued and rights
have vested thereunder, the adoption of a zoning ordinance prohibiting· the permitted use of property does not
ipso facto revoke the permit.
Atlas vs. Dick 81 NYS 2d 126 (1948) holds: One
\vho has merely obtained a building permit is bound by
any change in zoning ordinance made before he proceeds with construction of building thereunder, but
where operations have been begun and contracts let
under a permit valid when issued permittee thereby
acquires vested rights which oannot be taken from him
by subsequent modification of zoning ordinance.

POINT II.
APPELLANT DID NOT LOSE HIS VESTED RIGHT
TO CONSTRUCT A SERVICE STATION WHEN
NATIONAL WAR EMERGENCY LEGISL~ATION
PREVENTED HIM FROM OBTAINING PRIORITIES FOR BUILDING MATERIALS.
The evidence in this case and also the findings
clearly show that the appellant exercised all possible
effort to obtain building materials to proceed with the
construction of the station. He went to the Anderson
Lumber Company, Wheelwright Lumber Company, Burton Walker Lumber Company in Ogden, and also wHnt
to Ed White Electric and Ogden Electric Company to
9
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obtain materials. (Tr. 51) Finding of the Court substantiates this evidence. Although necessity for obtaining priorities was terminated July 25, 1947, the evidence
before- the court shows tha.t it was not possible- to obtain many materials needed in the construction of the
service station, such as electric wiring, steel, re-inforcing iron,' cement, metal sashes. (Tr. 68, 69, 70 and 71)
Ge-orge Ward, l\1anager of the Anderson Lumber
Company testified that after July 25, 1947, the supply
of cement was so short that even after July 25, 1947,
_and through 1948, only about one-tenth of the demand
for cement could be supplied, and that cement, upon a
few occasions, WJas shipped from California into this
market to help supply part of the trade. (Tr. 70) As to
steel re-inforcing bars and metal sashes, the-y were almost non-existent during 1947 and 1948. (Tr. 71)
Mr. Joseph Behling·, representative of the Salt L~ake
Hardware Company, dealers in builders lines, builders hardware, tanks machine pipe. fittings, plumbing·
fittings and electrical equipment and wiring, testified
that all of these articles were very difficult to obtain
in the years 1945, 1946 and 1947, and that some of them
started to ease off in the middle of 1948, but critical
shortages did continue even into the year 1949, such as
pipe and other ste-el products and tank plate. (Tr. 3233-34).
The testimony of Mr. Ward and Mr. Behling is uneontradioted. However, even were there no such te·stimony in this oase, it is a matter of common knowledge
of which the Court may take judicial notice that critical
shortages in building materials continued through the
year 1948. Under such conditions we submit that it cannot reasonably be said that the appellant did not use
10
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due diligence because he did not apply for renewal of his
permit until Oc,tober 13, 1948. Very clearly it wa.s not until then that an indiYidual such as the appellant, could
reasonably belieYe that he mig-ht then stand some chance
of getting materials.
The findings prepared by the respondent in Parag·raph 13 sets forth certain construction under permits
issued by Ogden City, "\Yhich "\Yas completed during the
years 1945, 1946 and 1947. There is nothing in the
record to show whether or not the builders. bad priorities issued by proper authority, but it must be· presumed that they did have such priorities.
In ParagTpah 14 of the findrngs is set forth certain
construction "\Yhich 'vas completed during the years 1947
and 1948. Likewise in relation to at least some of these
where the permit issued prior to July 25, 1947, it mus,t
be presumed that sucb building had priorities and as to
the few remaining, it does not appear in the record how
or where ma.terials were obtained, so tha.t these findings
have little evidentiary weight as to the f.acts in this case.
The building permit issued by Ogden City to appellant created a contract under which appellant had a
vested right to construct a servjce station. lie was prevented from performing the time requirements jn the
permit because of the national 'va.r emergency and his
inahili ty to so comply is legally excused by reason of
the paramount war emergency. rrhe principal of law
governing such situations is well and clearly enunciated
in the case of National Grain Yeast Corp. v. City of
Crystal Lake, 147 F 2d 711 (CCA ·7th 1945), in which
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals says :
11
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''Nor can the court, nor should the defendant,
ignore the effect of the World War on efforts of
parties to comply with contract obligations and
requirements.
'.;The extent to which parties may justifi~ably expect relief in a court of equity upon a showing
that the failure to perform was because of inability to secure priorities, etc., due to the War,
presents a question upon which final judicial pronouncement has not been made.
"It is our belief that courts of equity Will not
close the door of relief to a party who has diligently and in good faith attempted to complete
its contract, but who has been wholly or in part
prevented from so doing because of the first demands and requirements of the Government in
the prosecution of the War.''
Also in a rec.ent case appealed to the Circuit Court
of Appeals from the Federal District Court of Utah,
.New York Life Insurance Company v. Durham, 166 F2d
87 4, the Court states the following principal of law:
''Private rights, when affected by the incidence of
War, are governed by determinations of political
departments of government, and courts will
usually condition private rights whether resting
in contract or otherwise, in order to give full
effect to the exigencies of War."
POINT III
BOARD OF CITY COMMISSIONERS OF OGDEN
CITY HAD POWER TO RENEW APPELLANT'S
BUILDING PERMIT.
Inasmuch a.s appellant did not lose his vested right
to construct the service station by reason of his being
12
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prevented from proceeding· because of the war emer•
gency, most certainly the Board of City Commissione·rs
of Og·den City had po,ver to grant renewal of his
original permit. \V e assert that the provisions in the
Building· C·ode, "~hich are incorporated in the building
permit, providing against abandoning· the work for a period of sixty (60) days, or a period of one year with
respect to a ne'v permit at half fee, are provisions designed to obtain reasonable diligenee in prosecuting
work under building permits and are analogous to statutes of limitation. Provisions of limitations statutes
may be waived and '"·e submit that for the very good
cause of impossibility of performance due to war restrictions the Board of City Commissioners had the
power to waive these time provisions and renew appellant's permit. When the holder of a building permit
is prevented from pursuing the work within the time
specified by the paramount requirement of government
due to war, we do not believe that it was the intention
of the City and its Building Code to make the~ permit
an absolute nullity because of such excusable failure to
meet a time limitation.
The City Commission, being an administrative body,
has power to review the facts upon which appellant
based his application for renewal of his permit, and
when it determined that those facts justified waiver of
the time limitations and renewal ·of the permit such
determination became conclusive. The Courts will not
review the findings of an administ]}ative body in such
matters unle~ss there is arbitrary abuse of discretion.
Clearly there was no abuse of discretion here. The City
Commission held hearings at which both respondents
13
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rand appellant were present, together with their counsel,
and it was only after a careful and fair consideration,
upon hearings had, that the Board of City Commissioners determined that appellant should have a renewal of
his building permit. There being no arbitrary action
nor abuse of d~scretion by this administrative body, we
submit tha.t its determination is final and cannot be
reviewed by the· courts.
T~e

law in this regard is succinctly stated by McQuillin on Municipal Corporations in Volume 1, Second
Edition, Paragraph 390, Page 1068 as follows:
''Assuming that the municipal authorities have
acted within the orbit of their lawful authority,
no principle of law is better established than that
courts will not sit in review of proceedings of
municipal officers and departments, especially
those involving legislative discretion, in the absence of had faith, fraud, arbitrary action or
. abuse· of power.'' ·
This rule is so well established that it would he a
work of supererogation to cite the voluminous number
of cases supporting the rule. For other general statements of the rule, we refer the Court to 42 American
Jurisprudence, Paragraph 209, Page 610, et. seq., and 43
AmeTican Jurisprudence, Paragraph 255, pages 72, 73.
One of the many cases stating the rule is that of Henry
Bennett et al vs. State Corporation Commission, 142
Pae. 2d 810, 150 ALR 1140, a Kansas case, which holds:
''In the ahs-ence of arbitrary or capricious
action or .abuse of discretion by executive or admini;s·trative offieers, courts do not interfere
14
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"~ith

the performance of their acts which are discretionary in character or involve the e·xerc.ise
of judgment.''
The Building ('iode of Ogden City in effect a.t the
time appellant obtained his building permit, provided.
for a. Board of Eocaminers and Appeals, which would
have po"""er to grant relief 'vith respect to the requirements of building· permits in rases where a manifest injustice would be done. No such Board has ever been
appointed by Ogden City as is found in Finding 11 of
the District Court. Had there been such a Board of
Appeal, appellant might haYe gone before it and sought
relief with respect to renewel of his building permit,
because of the manifest injustic-e which would be done
him should the impossible be required of his complying
with the time provisions in the permit when prevented
from doing· so by the Government requirements for priorities. There being no such Board of Appeal, most
assuredly the City Commission of Ogden City could
exercise such power as might have been exercised by
such subordinate Board had one been in existence. Thus
the City Commission very clearly acted within its powe-rs
in granting appellant relief by renewing the original
permit.
There was in existence a Board of Adjustme·nt in
Ogden City as provided by Section 15-8-95, Laws of
Utah (1943), and respondents may argue that appellant should have applie·d to that Board. However, such
Board of Adjustment has no power to determine matters pertaining to use of property under zoning ordinances, nor matters pertaining to renewal of building
permits and, therefore, such Board of Adjustment
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would have had no power to hear appellant nor grant
him any relief had he gone before it. The law with
respect to this is found in the case of Walton vs. Tracy
Loan and Trust Company, 97 Utah 249, 92 Pac. 2d 724
.
'
where the limitations of power of such Boards of Adjustment were adjudicated by this Court.
POINT IV
APPELL·ANT DID NOT ABANDON THE INTENDED CONSTRUCTION OF THE SERVICE
STATION.
There is no finding by the District Court that the
appellant, Boyd N. Fronk, ever abandoned construction
of the Service Station, nor does the evidence support
a conclusion of law of abandonment.
POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT E,RRED IN GRANTING
AN INJUNCTION IN THIS CASE.
Respectfully submitted
SAMUEL C. POWELL
614 David Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
DERRAH B. VAN DYKE
502 David Eccles Building
Ogden, U,tah
Attorneys for Appellant
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